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LmEL AND SLANDER-TESTAMENTARY LmEL-Although the right
to recover for injury from admittedly defamatory matter would seem
to be clear, the law imposes a series pf obstacles when the offending
statements are embodied in a will. Of the few cases which have arisen
in this area,1 a recent decision, Carver v. Morrow,2 serves to illustrate

1 Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (1901); Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128
Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914); Citizens' and Southem National Bank v. Hendricks,
176 Ga. 692, 168 S.E. 313 (1933); Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 A. 487 (1934);
Brown v. Maclc, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1945).
2 (S. C. 1948) 48 S.E. (2d) 814.
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the general problem. In this case, plaintiff claimed that portions of
testatrix' will defamed him. After the will was probated, he brought
an action against testatrix' executors on the ground that publication
had been effected by probate, and that therefore a cause of action in
libel existed against the estate. In affirming a lower court decision
sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, the court held that, since
publication did not occur until probate, testatrix could not have been
sued for libel during her life. Hence, such an action will not lie
against the estate unless the executor can be deemed her agent for
the purpose of consumating the tort. Because the executor is an instrumentality of the law, he cannot be considered testatrix' agent in
this sense. Further, there can be no agency uncoupled with an interest where there is no existent principal.
The initial questions to be faced will concern application to these
facts of the doctrine that a "personal action dies with the person." In
later discussion, the various remedial courses open to the defamed
party will be considered: :first, in jurisdictions applying the doctrine;
and second, in jurisdictions where the doctrine has been held inapplicable.
In the absence of a pertinent survival statute, a cause of action for
defamation arising against the testator during his lifetime is extinguished at his death. 3 Prior to the American states' adoption of the common law, it is by no means evident4 that this doctrine was literally
applied to material facts in causes of action which arose after the
testator's death. 5 Thus, no significant barriers of precedent exist to
an American court's re-examination of the rule in this area on policy
grounds. The actual bases at early common law for holding that causes
of action in tort died with the wrongdoer probably stemmed from the
quasi-penal character then attributed to torts,6 and from the law's
concern because the dead tortfeasor would be unable to testify in
a 134 A.L.R. 718 (1941).
4Winfield, ''Death as Affecting Liability in Tort," 29 CoL. L. REv. 239 at 241-250
(1929).
5 Publication is a requisite to a cause of action in libel. PROSSER, TORTS 810 (1941).
Therefore if publication occurred only at probate, a cause of action could not arise until ·
that time. If publication occurred during life, as to witnesses at the execution of the
will, an additional problem arises. One court has held that even though the cause of
action thus accruing during life would die with the testator, the probate proceeding
would be a republication and thus would give rise to another cause of action. Brown v.
Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1945).
6 See Winfield, "Death as Affecting Liability in Tort," 29 CoL. L. REv. 239 at
249 (1929); Finlay v. Chirney, 20 Q.B. 494 at 504 (1888); PoLLoCK, TORTS 61 (1920).
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his own behalf. 7 The first of these reasons carries little authority
today, since the law of torts is now directed toward compensating the
injured plaintiff and not toward punishing the tortfeasor. 8 The second argument is indicated to be of equal insignificance by the number
of survival statutes which in their very existence demonstrate the degree of unimportance placed on the absence of the tortfeasor from the
witness stand.0 Thus it appears that there is no present reasonable
basis for application of the doctrine.

2.
Some courts, however, have held the rule to be applicable to a
material fact in a cause of action.10 In these states there are still
several possible avenues of relief. The survival statutes might be held
to apply, but most state statutes have been or would be held inapplicable either as a matter of form11 or substance12 to a cause of action
in defamation not accruing until after death.
Another form of relief may be available, however, in those jurisdictions where the probate court is empowered to delete parts of the
will.13 Although the remedy has been utilized by some courts, certain
difficulties would seem to limit its efficacy. First, by the very act of
petitioning the court for deletion, it seems that publication would be
7Winfield, "Death as Affecting Liability in Tort," 29 CoL. L. R:Bv. 239 at 249
(1929).
s PnossEn, Ton'l's 10 (1941).
9 Evans, "A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Claims for and
against Executors and Administrators," 29 MioH. L. R:Bv. 969 (1931); 27 h.L. L. R:Bv.
220 (1932).
lOCitizens' and Southern National Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S.E. 313
(1933); Brown v. Maclt, 185 Misc. 368 at 371, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1945) (court
implied that maxim applies, but decided survival statute also applicable); United States
Casualty Co. v. Rice, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 18 S.W. (2d) 760; Shupe v. Martin,
321 Mo. 811, 12 S.W. (2d) 450 (1928).
11 Shupe v. Martin, 321 Mo. 811, 12 S.W. (2d) 450 (1928); United States Casualty
Co. v. Rice, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 18 S.W. (2d) 760. In both of these cases the statute
read: "All causes of action upon which suit ... may be hereafter brought ... shall not
abate by reason of the death of the person against whom such cause of action shall have
accrued." Contra: Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1945), where
the statute read: "No cause of action ..• shall be lost because of the death of the
person liable for the injury."
12 Evans, "A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Claims for and
against Executors and Administrators," 29 MICH. L. R:Bv. 969 (1931), in which the author
cites six states allowing survival of a defamation action where the statute applies in form.
It seems that New York must be added to this list. Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368,
56 N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1945).
13 In re Draske, 160 Misc. 587, 290 N.Y.S. 581 (1936); 21 MmN. L. R:Bv. 870
(1937).
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effected, although by the deletion the extent of publication would
be limited. Second, in many cases deletion of defamatory matter
might not be possible because of its connection with the dispository
function of the will. 14 Still another possibility, although a highly
unlikely one,1 5 is to avoid application of the doctrine by invoking
the remedial fiction of quasi-contract, the required "benefit" to the
dead tortfeasor being the saving of expenditure in his not having had
to purchase the right to libel the plaintiff.16

3.
Some courts have held, with what seems like greater justification,
that the rule has no application to material facts occurring during
the tortfeasor's life if the cause of action of which they are a part
did not accrue until after his death.17 Under this view a further
mode of relief may be available in the form of an action against the
executor, qua executor, without recourse to a survival statute.18 A
major obstacle to such a suit exists, however, in the very fact that the
cause of action did not accrue until after the testator's death. Assuming that a dead man cannot commit a tort, on what theories can
liability be based? Two courts have held that the executor was the
testator's agent for the purpose of publishing the libel.1° Coupled
with the rule that a principal is liable for defamation by his agent,
at least within the scope of his express authority, 20 this would seem
14 Where a will reads, "To A, my illegitimate son, nothing; to B, my legitimate
son, $1000," the word "illegitimate" might be made the basis for an action by A to deny
probate, if A is in fact legitimate and B is illegitimate. See Freifield, "Libel by Will,"
19 A.B.A.J. 301 (1933).
15 See Plefka v. Detroit United Ry., 147 Mich. 641, Ill N.W. 194 (1907);
Singley v. Bigelow, 108 Cal. App. 436, 291 P. 899 (1930).
16 See the dissent in Phillips v. Homfray, 24 Ch. Div. 439 (1883).
17 Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1913); Gallagher's
Estate, IO Pa. Dist. 733 (1901).
18 Suit could also be brought against the executor individually. However, since
he is under a duty to probate the will [2 WoERNER, ADMINISTRATION 703 (1923)],
his publication at probate is considered to be absolutely privileged. Brown v. Mack, 185
Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1945); Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573,
162 S.W. 584 (1913). It should be noted, however, that the executor is under a duty
to protect and preserve the estate. Casperson v. Dunn, 42 N.J. Eq. 87 (1886). In a
state allowing deletion of defamatory matter, where the matter is clearly non-dispositive
and where a recovery in libel is later had against the estate, it would seem that an action
for breach of the executor's duty would lie for the excessive publication. See 32 VA. L.
REv. 189 (1945).
19 Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1913); In re
Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (1901).
20 20 MINN. L. REv. 805 (1936); 150 A.L.R. 1330 (1944).
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to ground liability for the testator and hence for the estate. However,
in ~ost states, a will does not create the executorship, but merely
nominates for an appointment effected by law.21 Thu_s, in these states
an execution cannot be considered an agent. 22 Further, an agency
cannot be created to take effect at death unless it is coupled with an
interest,23 and ~e right of the executor to reimbursement for services
does not provide such an interest.24
Liability can be based on another more substantial theory, however. Where a writer of defamatory matter intends or has reason to
suppose that the matter will reach third parties, there is responsibility
for the publication.25 This is clearly the situation in the case of a
will since the testator, by naming an executor who is under a duty
to probate the will,26 certainly has reason to suppose that probate will
be effected. This being the case, although no cause for action arises
until after the testator's death, the responsibility for publication is
fully the testator's during life, and an action should lie against his
estate.27
One further problem remains. It is the general rule that absolute
immunity attaches to defamatory matter published in the course of
and relevant to a judicial proceeding.28 Since this immunity has been
helcl to attach to publications which constitute a step in such proceeding,29 the defense would seem to be available with respect to publications effected in the process of probate. 80 Before the immunity at211 WoBIINEI\, &>MINISTRATION 589 (1923).
22 ''In the broad sense, agency denotes the relation which exists when one person
is employed to act for another." MBcHBM, AGENCY, 3d ed., 6 (1923). Some courts do
hold that the executor derives his authority from the will. 1 WoBRNBR, &>MINISTRATION
589 (1923).
28 Wellborn v. Weaver, 17 Ga. 267 (1855).
24Gardner v. First Nat. Bank of Billings, 10 Mont. 149, 25 P. 29 (1890).
25Hedgepeth v. Coleman, 183 N.C. 309, 111 S.E. 517 (1922); 24 A. L. R. 232
(1922); Lane v. Schilling, 130 Ore. 119, 279 P. 267 (1929).
26 2 WoBRNBR, &>MINISTRATION 703 (1923).
27Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1945).
28 Veeder, "Absolute Immunity in Defamation," 9 CoL. L. RBv. 463 at 474 (1909).
There is authority to the contrary. 16 A.L.R. 750 (1922).
29 Veeder, "Absolute Immunity in Defamation," 9 CoL. L. RBv. 463 at 487 (1909).
80 One court has held that since the testator's execution of the will is not a part
of a judicial proceeding, the concept of immunity is inapplicable to an action against
the estate. Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1945). It is submitted
that the circumstances in execution are irrelevant as long as the offensive publication is
found to have been consummated in the course of a judicial proceeding. The further
publication effected by recordation of the probate judgment would also seem to come
within the immunity, since such action is apparently an inherent part of the process.
57 AM. Jun., Wills, §933 (1948).
•
.
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taches, however, it must appear that the publication is relevant. 31
The narrowest definition given to "relevant" is that the matter must
be pertinent to some issue in the case.32 Other courts have held that
a statement is relevant if it relates or refers to the subject of inquiry. 33
On this basis, under either view, if the defamatory matter is pertinent
to the expression of dispository intent, the immunity should attach
to inclusion of the language by the testator in his will. 34 If the matter
does not meet either test of relevancy, a suit should lie against the
executor in his representative capacity.35
· Charles Hansen, S.Ed.
31 Veeder, "Absolute Immunity in Defamation," 9 CoL. L. RBv. 463 at 489 (1909).
s2 White v. Carroll, 42 N.Y. App. 161, 1 A.R. 503 (1870).
33 PROSSER, TORTS 825 (1941).
3 4 Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 A. 487 (1934); contra, Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc.
368, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1945).
35 Where a testator drafts a will for the primary purpose of defaming, it seems that unless
the matter is determined to be irrelevant, the immunity will still attach. Gaines v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 104 Ky. 695, 47 S.W. 884 (1898) (knowingly false and defamatory matter included in
pleadings); 16 A.L.R. 749 (1922). Such a holding may well go beyond the point of proper
balance between individual rights and the interest of society in securing full discussion of all
matters before its judicial tribunals.

